Wednesday, 27 May 2015

BOOK LAUNCH The BBC’s ‘Irish Troubles’ Television, Conflict and Northern Ireland

    ***Author Professor Robert Savage is available for interviews in advance***


Friday, May 29th, 6pm
Trinity Long Room Hub, Trinity College Dublin

The BBC’s ‘Irish Troubles’ Television, Conflict and Northern Ireland, by Robert Savage, Professor of the Practice of History at Boston College, uses recently released archival material from the BBC and a variety of UK government archives to explore the contentious relationship between broadcasting officials, politicians, the army, police and civil service from the outbreak of violence through to the 1980s.

Professor Savage completed the new publication while a visiting research fellow at the Trinity Long Room Hub Arts & Humanities Research Institute in Trinity College Dublin. The book will be launched in Trinity Long Room Hub at 6pm on Friday, May 29th, 2015.

Focusing on the incessant wrangling between political elites, civil servants, military officials, broadcasting authorities and journalists about what should and should not be featured on the BBC's regional and national networks, Professor Savage considers how the BBC’s broadcasts complicated the ‘Troubles' by challenging decisions, policies and tactics developed by governments trying to defeat a stubborn insurgency that threatened national security.

In many cases the anxiety and controversy created by these political skirmishes challenged the ability of the medium to accurately inform citizens of important events taking place, thereby undermining the BBC's role as a public service provider, according to Professor Savage.

The book illustrates that as the ‘Troubles’ escalated, the BBC was attacked, threatened and bullied, by a variety of actors but did its best to stand its ground and maintain editorial independence and journalistic credibility.

Key Points:

·         In spite of the infamous broadcasting restrictions put in place in 1988, professional staff remained determined to provide the public with informed news and information about the conflict. Broadcasters resisted government efforts to silence voices that, although controversial, were critical to comprehending and eventually resolving a long and bloody conflict. The broadcasting ban was seen as despotic by many broadcasters who, with the support of senior staff, cleverly worked around it by using sub-titles and then hiring actors to read the words of Sinn Féin politicians. Reporting on ‘the Troubles’ became somewhat surreal as talented actors including Stephen Rea and Ian McElhinney found work dubbing the remarks of Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness.

·         The BBC in Northern Ireland slowly evolved to become more independent and less deferential to the Unionist Government at Stormont. By the late 1960s  its managers and editors understood the need for an independent editorial posture and became more critical of the politics, policies and pronouncements of the Unionist Government.

·         Labour and Conservative Governments alike tried to pressure, censor and bully the BBC both in Belfast and London. These governments were convinced that the BBC coverage of the turmoil in Northern Ireland undermined their efforts to defeat terrorism.  These governments were acutely aware of the power of television to damage the image of the United Kingdom at home and abroad and struggled to succeed in winning the ‘propaganda war’.

·         The national network knew little about the complexities of Northern Ireland until the beginning of the campaign for civil rights began to gain traction in the province. By providing informed, critical coverage of events the BBC helped undermine a regional parliament that had long governed without consensus.

Professor Savage commented: “Throughout the conflict British governments tried to shape the way in which television depicted the struggle against paramilitaries, especially the Provisional IRA. However, its relentless presence undermined government efforts to present a simple picture of the forces of law and order trying to defeat savage terrorists hell-bent on a campaign of murder and mayhem. All those involved in the conflict hoped to produce a narrative for both domestic and international audiences to justify their role in an increasingly bitter and violent struggle.”

“The propaganda war that ensued created much consternation for officials in London, Belfast, and Dublin who understood the conflict presented a real and immediate threat to social order. Rules, regulations and policies that tried to suppress, shape or ‘spin’ coverage of the conflict were intended to marginalise extremists. Governments were acutely aware of the power of television to encourage sympathy or support for the very organisations they sought to destroy.”

Professor Jürgen Barkoff, Director of Trinity Long Room Hub Arts & Humanities Research Institute commented: “The Trinity Long Room Hub is proud to have supported, through its Visiting research Fellows programme, such a groundbreaking book. Professor Savage’s stay at the research institute was an enriching and highly stimulating experience for everyone involved and we are particularly pleased that new collaborations developed out his time with us such as the special edition of the journal Éire/Ireland, co-edited with Professor Christopher Morash from the School of English.”


Media Contact:
Fiona Tyrrell, Press Officer for the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences, Trinity College Dublin | tyrrellf@tcd.ie | + 353 1 8964337 and + 353 87 6169056

Jack Dunn, Director, Office of News & Public Affairs, Boston College| jack.dunn@bc.edu | + 1 617 552 3350

About Robert Savage:
Robert Savage is Professor of the Practice of History at Boston College. He completed his latest publication while a Visiting Research Fellow at the Trinity Long Room Hub in 2012. Other publications include A Loss of Innocence? Television and Irish Society 1960-1972

(2010), Sean Lemass: a biography (1999 revised and expanded edition 2014), Irish Television: the Political and Social Origins (1996). He is currently co-editing a special edition of the journal Éire/Ireland with Christopher Morash, Seamus Heaney Professor of Irish Writing at Trinity, and is writing a chapter on film and the broadcast media for the four volume Cambridge History of Ireland edited by Thomas Bartlett.

Monday, 11 May 2015

Making oneself at home: domestic life in the colonies of the British Empire


By Dianne Lawrence





The people over the road are moving out, the whole kit and caboodle: the chairs and beds, the IT paraphernalia, cat-basket, books, tele’ and lawn mower. In the year I’ve lived here I’ve been aware of at least half a dozen such moves. Once an aquarium left and a drum kit moved in, though thankfully that was at the other end of the street. No sooner will this lot of  vans and over-loaded cars drive away than the incomers will show up and carry in a set of belongings that are at one and the same time identical to the outgoings items and yet, utterly different.  The items may be the same, but the assemblage and its meanings will be unique to that household.

I use the word ‘belongings’ in the preceding paragraph because I think that most accurately describes   our relationship with our ‘stuff’. To speak of ‘possessions’ suggests it’s a one way arrangement, and fails to make due allowance for the power we grant to our objects, particularly those in our homes. They are an expression of our subjectivity, but because we set them within a mesh of associated practices they have agency in constructing our identity. They perform a mediating function in the circumstances of our lives, but they’re not impartial in that mediation.

It was an interest in such processes of domesticity that prompted my investigation into the home-making practices of a specific sort of British women living in colonies of the British Empire (Genteel women: empire and domestic material culture, 1840-1910).  The women concerned were members of social elites, who adhered to a set of values, a highly nuanced form of knowledge known as gentility. Such individuals deemed themselves to be in a position of superiority, elevated above those around them, who were, by definition, considered to be ‘vulgar’. Genteel values were expressed through modes of behaviour in conjunction with material means. Put simply – they were accustomed to having access to, and using, a lot of ‘stuff’. Their ‘belongings’ were critical in negotiating the circumstances of their lives. How, I questioned, had such women not merely survived, but actually prospered when faced with the rigours of and, by their terms of reference, material deprivation of colonial life?

I wanted to see how their physical environments impacted on their cultural landscape. I identified genteel women who lived in the temperate zones of Aotearoa/New Zealand, south Australia and southern Africa and in the sub-tropical and tropical regions of northern Australia, India and West Africa. Selecting the geographical and temporal range – c1840-1910 -  permitted inclusion of women living in long-established British communities in India, the expanding and consolidating colonies of southern Australia and New Zealand and in newly emergent settlements of northern Australia and West Africa.

All the women I wrote about had relocated to set up homes in the company of a man to whom they were related by either blood or marriage. Their menfolk were working ‘out in the colonies’ – be it in a military, commercial, administrative or agricultural capacity – and one of the women’s primary functions was to support the men in their endeavours. Certainly his successes or failures would have been hers, but so too her contribution could develop and extend – or, horror of horrors, actually undermine their joint enterprise.

With so much hanging on their domestic management how had these women gone about not just setting up home, but actually making themselves feel at home? Where did they source all that complex material culture they held so dear? I chose to investigate their dress, living rooms, gardens and food management because they were the four areas seen by contemporaries as being the quintessential elements of genteel womanhood.

I started with such questions as: how did they get hold of a new corset, a set of dinner plates, living room curtains or seeds for  the garden, when a thousand miles or more and an ocean away from the retail riches of nineteenth century Britain, and what strategies evolved when one simply could not get hold of such items? The answers proved illuminating and a complex picture emerged, with gentility – both its ideology and expression – proving to have been responsive and adaptable to the many environmental changes it encountered. The women not only brought to bear a whole range of cultural competences acquired in their previous homes, they also developed different forms of genteel behaviours and practices as befitted their new location. Most striking of all, it’s evident that many women didn’t just become competent in the colonial site they developed a ‘sense of self’ in situ and became firmly attached to their new homes.

Perhaps it’s because the Spring sun is shining on my own garden that my thoughts turn to the work I did on the colonial women’s gardening practices. Initially I had my doubts as to whether I would be able to locate sufficient traces of this area of their homes, for by their very nature the gardens are long gone. My anxieties proved groundless, for the women so relished their gardens that they wrote about them constantly, and in great detail, in their letters and journals. Sarah Courage, who lived in New Zealand for 26 years, wrote ‘Whatever the employments of the day, I always contrived to find a little spare time for the flowers’ and Adela Stewart, who had been a complete novice on her arrival in the country subsequently reported ‘At the end of our 4th year I had become an enthusiastic gardener, and so continued, finding far more pleasure in growing flowers, vegetables and trees than in any other occupation.’ In addition to the women’s personal writing I was able to draw on seed and plant catalogues from Britain, Australia and India, gardening manuals from India and South Africa, memoirs from Nigeria and paintings and photographs made in Australia, India and New Zealand. There is ample material to underpin the argument that the spaces and practices of the women’s gardens had agency for the expression of gentility, and were highly significant in furthering these migrants’ attachment and sense of being at home, though far from ‘Home’.

I’ve become aware that the street is quiet once more, so perhaps I’ll leave this employment and ‘contrive a little spare time for my flowers...’

Dianne Lawrence is an Independent Scholar and the current holder of the Meryl Huxtable Bursary, as awarded by the Wallpaper History Society.

Tuesday, 21 April 2015

Greece vs. the Eurozone


The new Greek government that took office in January 2015 made a commitment during the election campaign that Greece would stay in the Eurozone. At the same time, it also declared that Greece’s relations with its European partners would be put on a new footing. This did not materialize. The Greek government accepted the continuation of the existing agreement with its lenders, the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission, and the European Central Bank. This was the only way of ensuring Greece would not run out of funding.
Throughout the negotiations, the crisis in Greece received intense media attention. Again, the very future of the Eurozone became a subject of much discussion on the international stage. Following days of uncertainty, public opinion in Greece appeared to have endorsed the softening of the government’s position vis-à-vis its lenders. But doubts about the future remain. The most pressing problem to be tackled by the government is covering its funding needs over the next few months. Greece will have to make a tremendous effort to meet the terms of the agreement. Within the Eurozone, there is a growing feeling that Greece is particularly problematic. The perception that the ‘Greek question’ has not yet been settled and that new difficulties will arise in the future still persists.
This most recent phase in the Greek crisis allows us to draw some general conclusions about the future of the Eurozone. The Eurozone is a project that goes well beyond the joint endeavors of its member states to implement a common monetary policy. The Eurozone has evolved into a very close form of cooperation, a joint system of addressing economic problems and building tools for its economic governance. In this context, wider political considerations cannot be disassociated from the economics of running Europe’s single currency. The recently enacted Banking Union is further evidence of the Eurozone’s continually expanding remit. In this new, more intensive form of cooperation, member states have far less room to act independently. Greece’s desire to be a part of the club without fully committing to its rules is increasingly out of touch with reality. All member states that are committed to this joint endeavor cannot neglect their responsibilities or pursue their own ‘independent’ agendas.
Despite its recent reforms and expanded remit, the Eurozone remains an unsatisfactory system of governance. While the Eurozone is now better prepared to deal with future financial crises, its ability to address their deep-rooted causes effectively is still limited. The pace of economic growth in Europe is sluggish, and—despite contrary proclamations—the problem has not yet been dealt with effectively. The initial reaction to the Greek debt crisis in 2010 failed to adequately assess the country’s economic problems, making a bad situation worse. The inability of the Eurozone’s political institutions to articulate a coherent response to the crisis put the spotlight on the European Central Bank (ECB) as a key player in overcoming the deadlock. In January 2015, the ECB launched a massive program of quantitative easing in order to boost economic growth. The ECB, however, is not a democratically accountable institution and its activities are not the subject of parliamentary scrutiny. In this sense, the ECB should not be permitted to assume the duties of a government.

“Exit from the Eurozone, it seems, is not a feasible option.”

During Syriza’s confrontation with the Eurozone, many predicted a ‘Grexit,’ or a Greek withdrawal from the Eurozone. Ultimately, Greece’s lenders did not push for it although there was incomprehension of the Greek stance. Hardliners back in Greece who had previously claimed that the Russians, the Chinese, or even the United States would come to Greece’s rescue also hesitated to press the ‘Grexit’ nuclear button. Exit from the Eurozone, it seems, is not a feasible option. Any country that attempts it will risk financial ruin. For the Eurozone itself, the financial cost of a potential exit may be manageable but the reputational damage to the project is too high to bear.
Despite the widespread belief that the Greek crisis highlighted the need for greater economic and political integration in Europe, recent developments in Athens point to the reverse. The Eurozone’s problems persist not because member states act too fast, but because they procrastinate. These problems will only multiply if each country continues to follow its own fiscal policy or implement Treaty provisions at its own discretion. A fiscal union encompassing a common budget and a common European tax regime, redistributive policies to mediate inequalities in the productive base of different countries, and the pooling of European debt in order to support the development of less successful economies, are both desirable and feasible. They must all be linked to the strengthening of the European Parliament or the creation of a Eurozone Parliament so that the leadership of the Union can be held accountable.

These developments will ensure that no member state—Greece, in particular—will be able to pursue its economic future outside the context of the Eurozone. It is only through cooperation with other member states that a country can improve its negotiating position and change the balance of power within the Eurozone. Greece’s own desire to remain in the ‘core’ of the European Union is inextricably linked to overcoming its own backwardness, pursuit of continuous reform in the public administration so that it is more cost-effective and productive, changes in its economy in order to enhance the productive and technological potential of the country, persistent efforts to defeat clientelistic networks and free-riding attitudes, as well as a new thinking on how to promote social justice and cohesion. Greece must also adopt a European policy that breaks away from its ‘traditional’ attitude of seeking exemptions and defending the self-defeating notion of its own exceptionalism. It is in every country’s interest not to be seen as a perpetual exception—a ‘problem’ that never goes away.

The European debt crisis: The Greek case
978-0-7190-9578-8  £17.99

Tuesday, 14 April 2015

England in 1820






What can we learn from looking at England in 1820? On the one hand, a great deal, but having said that, our understanding of this period has been hobbled by habitual Anglo-centricity. Even broadening out the scope of things and examining all four kingdoms of the United Kingdom does not suffice.

Great Britain and Ireland have to be seen in the context of 1820 being a year of European revolution. In September of that year, a leading London radical wrote that Thomas Paine, who died over a decade earlier, had ‘thought that he lived in the age of revolution…but the present moment better deserves that epithet’.

The revolutionary climate of 1820 was without parallel until 1848 and the actions of the British government, led by a Prime Minister (Lord Liverpool) who had actually witnessed the storming of the Bastille in 1789, must be evaluated in that context.

The heir to the French throne was assassinated and there were revolutions in Spain, Portugal and much of present-day Italy. And if we look to the early months of 1821 as well, there was a further Italian insurgency, insurrections against the Ottomans in Moldavia and Wallachia, and the dramatic development of an independence movement in Greece.

1820 was the most testing year for any nineteenth-century peacetime government. Stringent measures to suppress radical political activity had been introduced by Liverpool’s Ministry in the wake of the Peterloo massacre the previous August. Their effect, however, was mainly to drive protest underground and make it harder to monitor, while simultaneously stimulating the popular press to yet-more innovative forms of expression. Against a widely rumoured background of revolutionary conspiracy, there were popular uprisings in Scotland and northern England. Bitter social conflict in western Ireland, expressed mainly through an elusive protest movement called the Ribbonmen, tied-down whole regiments of the army. Back in London elements within the Brigade of Guards were mutinous. And a conspiracy to assassinate the entire Cabinet was only narrowly averted.

On top of all this George IV forced an embattled and nervous government to secure his divorce from Queen Caroline. Unprecedented popular indignation ensued, much of it from women reflecting a new politics of gender. The Caroline affair also triggered what we would now call a media frenzy: an explosion of satirical cartoons and pamphleteering, often ribald and some of it downright obscene, but all of it pointing to a revolution in popular print and political opinion.

Yet the political and social stability of the United Kingdom was maintained. It’s very interesting to think about not only how government was tested to the limit, but also how the processes and mechanisms through which social and political stability were maintained. A sense of involvement in – and ownership of – government increased among ‘the middling sort’. Ratepayers, who fell below the threshold for parliamentary voting or for service as magistrates, were being given an increasing stake in the government of the communities in which they lived. This process even occasionally included women too.

However, this book suggests that the ‘age of reform’ was a drawing out of processes that had been established earlier. The survival of parliament’s authority in 1820 may have been severely tested but how it survived is enlightening about the social and political stability of the United Kingdom in the longer perspective.

My book, 1820: disorder and stability in the United Kingdom takes this single, fascinating year in the broader context of Europe, revolution, and the periods before and after, to give a far longer perspective on the social and political stability of the United Kingdom. 

Monday, 13 April 2015

On the history of history teaching…






Debate about the teaching of history is never far away. The former Secretary of State for Education, Michael Gove, has sought since 2010 to reshape the history curriculum in schools by bringing in more coverage of British history and altering assessment techniques. His plans met with some serious resistance – including from academics and school teachers. The key areas of debate echoed those raised 25 years ago when a national curriculum for history was first introduced. The terms of the debate are also recognisable in contestation about the teaching of history in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. What are the aims of history teaching? Should politicians dictate the content of history lessons? What does the selection and omission of certain content reveal about the kind of national past we want children to grow up knowing? Should history be considered a conduit of citizenship education? Is there a direct correlation between the teaching of history and national identity? What influence should be given to specialist experts working in the educational sciences? What should be the relationship between the teaching of ‘facts’ over skills of historical enquiry and interpretation?

These debates – hostile and unresolved – are not new. The teaching of history has always been a topic for serious dispute. This was especially so in the period in which historical content was first taught as a compulsory component of the curriculum in the nation’s schools. In the late-Victorian period, educational provision was made compulsory and free and, given its vast cost, it is no surprise that contemporaries argued over its social and political functions. In the context of late-Victorian anxieties about the future of empire, it is little wonder moreover that the teaching of history specifically should have been the subject of such contentious discussion. Britain perceived itself threatened on two fronts: externally, she was concerned about the growth of economic and imperial competitors such as Germany; internally, the rise of an organised political Left coincided with fears about children’s emotional, moral and physical wellbeing. The combination of these factors meant that the teaching of history was prescribed, by some, as an antidote to a perceived crisis of national confidence. In such a context it is clear those seeking to promote ideologies of imperialism and patriotism saw in the teaching of history the opportunity to inculcate imperial values. To what extent was their influence the most significant? What were imperial ‘values’ and how was history intended to deliver these in a classroom context? These are just some of the questions that this book investigates.

The introduction of mass education also brought to the fore questions about how to teach. The late nineteenth century was also a period of deep-reaching investigations into pedagogy. Although there have been several studies into histories of history teaching, most have tended to focus on the content of resources used in the classroom – especially subject-specific history textbooks and historical reading books for younger children. But what of the sources used to instruct a new generation of teachers how to teach? ‘Manuals of Method’ have received less attention from researchers than they merit: these sources are valuable because, as a distinct genre of educational publishing, their authors are those who taught in teacher-training colleges, influenced the production of classroom resources, and were some of the loudest voices in debates about history teaching. In the absence of centralised state regulations on what history to teach, and how to teach it, these manuals serve ostensibly as documents of best practice. The study of these sources reveals that the intentions behind history teaching were far more complex than previously acknowledged. In addition, evidence from manuals exhibits the debt British educationists owed to continental educational theorists – in particular a little studied group called the Herbartians who came to dominate. Herbartians emphasised the centrality of history – as a subject that would mobilise the emotions – to the teaching of civic and moral values. These values, in turn of the twentieth-century England, could be made to tally with wider national and imperial objectives. In the book, I explore the extent of the Herbartian dominance of the curriculum. It appears that history teaching only became such a vital part of national-identity teaching because its teachers embraced cutting-edge educational psychology. We seem nowadays, with the state’s emphasis on facts over skills, to somewhat have reversed the ratchet.

Parallels with current disputes about history education are acute, especially so since the ‘history’ of history teaching is often mobilised in both sides of the debate. This book, therefore, aims to provide a history of the relationship between history teaching and pedagogy, and an investigation of the wider implications of this in debates about the contribution of history teaching to popular imperialism, citizenship, nation and identity.

Citizenship, nation, empire, by Peter Yeandle, is available now http://www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk/cgi-bin/indexer?product=9780719080128

Thursday, 12 March 2015

Can you help us find a copyright holder?




We're asking our authors, readers and friends in the community at large to look at this map, which we'd like to use for a book project.  If you know where it comes from, or who photographed it, or any information about it that might be useful in our search, then please get in touch with our Editorial Director: emma.brennan@manchester.ac.uk Thank you. 

Monday, 23 February 2015

Wonder Women


The Wonder Women 2015 festival begins soon, and Manchester will play host to a really exciting range of cultural events.

MUP’s list, meanwhile, is full of Wonder Women. Alongside backlist gems such as Patsy Stoneman’s book on Elizabeth Gaskell, and Janet Lee’s War Girls on the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry, our history list boasts a wealth of biographies of pioneering female figures in the fight for women’s rights and in politics more generally, including Eva Gore-Booth, Evelyn Sharp, Elizabeth Wolstenholme Elmy, and most recently ‘Red Ellen’ Wilkinson. John Carter-Wood’s book The most remarkable woman in England follows the case of Beatrice Pace, who became a media celebrity in the 1920s after being accused of the murder of her husband. The 1920s were an important decade for Wonder Women, and Lucy Bland examines this period in Modern women on trial: sexual transgression in the age of the flapper. For those interested in how women’s protests affected early twentieth-century politics, Jill Liddington’s book Vanishing for the Vote is a very readable account of the suffragette census boycott in 1911. It uses engaging and thoroughly human stories to bring this key moment in women’s history to life, and explains the political context along with the reasons why key figures decided against the boycott.

The festival will coincide with International Women’s Day, and our catalogue boasts lots of international Wonder Women. Alistair Thomson’s Moving stories looks at four British women who embarked on new lives in Australia. It’s a remarkable collaboration between author and four ordinary women who were extraordinary letters-writers, family photographers and memoirists recording in intimate detail aspects of everyday life and women's experience that are often lost to history. Helen Boak’s Women in the Weimar Republic takes the First World War as a starting point, and explores the great changes in the lives, expectations and perceptions of German women, with new opportunities in employment, education and political life and greater freedoms in their private and social life, all played out in the media spotlight.

We’re very excited to be putting the finishing touches to Natalya Vince’s Our fighting sisters, which is based on oral interviews with Algerian women who were combatants in the fight to end French rule. We’ve also announced Eva Gore-Booth’s political writings in a single volume, edited by Sonja Tiernan, and a huge edition of Anne Clifford’s Great books of record, a wonderful 600-year history written by a fascinating seventeenth-century landowner and patron of the arts.

We’re very proud of our Wonder Women and we hope you’ll enjoy reading about them. 

To celebrate the festival, enjoy this extract from the wonderful Vanishing for the Vote by Jill Liddington. 
Jill will be speaking as part of the festival on Thursday 12th March. We hope to see you there! 


Wednesday, 28 January 2015

Greece- The shape of things to come

In the aftermath of the Greek general election, which put SYRIZA, an anti-austerity left wing party, into power in coalition with far-right Independent Greeks, Dimitris Papadimitriou Professor of European politics at The University of Manchester, explores the situation and assess the possible impact.So, there you have it! Greek bailout politics have come full circle. On Tuesday a new coalition government was sworn in in Athens. SYRIZA has won a landslide victory against their conservative rivals, New Democracy, but have failed to win an outright majority in parliament. The new Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, was in need of a coalition partner and it did not take him long to find one. The right wing populist party, Independent Greeks, will join the new government and will be rewarded with a number of senior ministerial appointments. Earlier hopes of a coalition between SYRIZA and the moderate centre left party, To Potami, were dashed the day after the election. Apparently, To Potami was not ‘anti-bailout enough’ for Mr Tsipras.
In Panos Kammenos, the leader of Independent Greeks, the new Prime Minister of Greece finds a partner with impeccable anti-bailout credentials. Mr Kammenos and his party are indeed a product of Greece’s polarised bailout politics. He broke away from New Democracy in 2012 and since then has been a fierce critic of what he regards as Greece’s “occupation” by its creditors. Last year a prominent member of his party accused the EU of being a “bunch of gays”, prompting a humorous rebuff by the Prime Minister of Luxembourg. Earlier, Mr Kammenos himself had warned Greeks that they were being sprayed with secret chemicals in order to subdue their opposition to the bailout. He is a die-hard defender of displaying paraphernalia of the Orthodox Church in public buildings and believes that Greece’s future lies in a strategic partnership with his political idol, Russia’s Vladimir Putin.
On Monday, Mr Tsipras became the EU’s youngest leader and the first PM in Greek history who refused to take a religious oath when he assumed office. How can these two agendas co-exist in the same government? Why didn’t Mr Tsipras opt for a more moderate partner? Drawing a parallel to Britain, recent developments in Athens are the equivalent of having Michael Foot and Nigel Farage in charge of renegotiating the UK’s membership of the European Union.
In understanding this farce, one has to look at the effects of the bailout programme on Greek politics. The two-party system that emerged following Greece’s transition to democracy in 1974 has been shattered by the austerity of the past five years. In 2009 the collective strength of the Greek Socialists, PASOK, and New Democracy was in excess of 77% of the vote. On Sunday their share of the vote was just over 31%. The old guard has been swept away, discredited in the eyes of ‘indignant citizens’ as corrupt and subservient to the demands of the ‘Troika’. The implementation of externally-prescribed austerity has led to the electoral annihilation of the mainstream. Anti-bailout rhetoric sells. Even if it comes wrapped in homophobia and religious fervour.
The arrival of Mr Tsipras’ colourful coalition in Greece is the shape of things to come across Europe. Above all it reflects the bankruptcy of the German moralistic austerity dogma. Mr Tsipras and Mrs Merkel are the opposite sides of the same coin. If Mr Tsipras succeeds in changing the dominant economic paradigm in the Eurozone, he will expose the shortcomings of German economic thinking over the past five years. If he fails, Greece’s descent into the abyss will remind Berlin what any good history book will tell you: extreme economics breeds extreme politics. Those who set the foundations of the German economic miracle after the war knew this very well.

Originally published on policy@manchester,
http://blog.policy.manchester.ac.uk/posts/2015/01/greece-the-shape-of-things-to-come/

Tuesday, 13 January 2015

Kudos





Manchester University Press is very pleased to announce a new partnership with Kudos.

Kudos is a free web-based service that helps researchers and authors maximize the visibility and impact of their published articles online.

For the author and researcher, Kudos provides a platform for assembling and creating information to help search, filter, share and supplement their publications to drive discovery and create digital community. Just as importantly, it is used for measuring and monitoring the effect of these activities.

Kudos is for researchers who want assistance with increasing usage of, and citations to, their publications. It is also for institutions and funders looking to increase the impact of the research that they fund and to help analyse the success of their funding. It is also very useful for publishers who want to develop closer relationships with their author communities.

Kudos can helps authors and researchers in three easy steps:

Firstly, it allows you to add a simple, non-technical explanation of your publication which will make it easier to find, and more accessible to a broader audience. Kudos will deposit this additional information about your article with a range of discovery services, all linking back to your publication, to ensure it is even easier to find, read and cite.

Secondly, the platform enables the attachment of rich digital assets that relate to your publication data, images, video, podcasts, blog entries – all things that explain an article and bring it to life. Not only does this enrich things for the reader but they become more inbound links to the article so it becomes more discoverable.

Thirdly, it helps authors broadcast their work more effectively. Kudos seeks to standardise the use of social media and support authors with their social media and online output to help share and distribute their work as much as possible.

If you are a Manchester University Press author and would like to explain, enrich and share links to your publications you can register for free at https://www.growkudos.com/about/researchers.

For more news and information you can visit the Kudos blog http://blog.growkudos.com/2014/11/18/kudos-growth-continues/.

If you have any questions about signing up please email robert.byron@manchester.ac.uk.

Monday, 5 January 2015

Britain's lost revolution?


With the upcoming publication of Britain's lost revolution? author, Daniel Szechi, has written a blog post regarding the subject and the book. 


Should Scotland be an independent nation?  The Scots people were directly asked this question last September, and a majority said ‘No’.  Had they been asked this question in the autumn of 1707, when the Scots Parliament was debating whether or not to enter a constitutional Union with England, there is little doubt that the answer would have been an overwhelming ‘Yes’.  Yet the Act of Union, solemnly debated and carefully amended in both the Scots and English Parliaments, finally passed into law in May 1707 despite the clear hostility of the ordinary people of Scotland.
            It was, of course, a very different world to our own, in which the wishes and aspirations of the common people counted for little.  But it was not just the humble folk who were dismayed and angered by being ‘bought and sold for English gold’ in the words of a famous song, many of their social superiors were equally outraged.  As far as a sizeable minority of the Scots elite were concerned Scotland had been betrayed, and it was their duty to rescue the nation and its birthright.
            But how?  In the early eighteenth century there was only one way to oppose a regime with a firm grip on power: armed rebellion.  Therein, however, lay a complex of problems.  The new British state was one of the most militarily powerful in Europe.  A gaggle of Scots nobility and heritors (gentry) and their tenants and servants, no matter how enthusiastic for the national cause, would find it very hard to fight the British army and win.  Scotland was also a poor nation and the Union offered the Scots people hope of a better life by commercial access to the English empire.  This would end if the Scots rebelled.  Then there was the question of what would happen next?  If the anti-Unionist Scots rebelled and succeeded in defeating the British state, what kind of Scotland did they want to restore?  In such an event the old regime in Scotland, subservient to Westminster and with an absentee monarch, was neither attractive nor feasible.
            Britain’s Lost Revolution is about the answer a coalition of anti-Unionists from within the Scots elite came up with in answer to these questions and a host of others.  We know them simply as the ‘Jacobites’, but there was a great deal more to their aims and ambitions than the simple restoration of the exiled Stuart dynasty.  Sure, they were willing to bring back James ‘VIII’, the son of James II and VII, as the king of Scotland, but only as part of a package.  This included full scale French military intervention to enable the rebels to fight the British army with some hope of success, privileged commercial access to the French colonial empire to replace the economic advantages of access to the English empire and James’s agreement to a raft of radical constitutional changes that would have turned Scotland into a noble republic that would never again be subservient to England.  Had the would-be rebels of 1708 succeeded the British Isles would have been transformed and the modern United Kingdom would not exist.  For a moment then, in March 1708, as the French invasion force set sail for Scotland the fate of everything we now assume is solid and certain about our constitution and its politics hung in the balance.  This was Britain’s lost revolution.

Britain's lost revolution? will be available from 31st January 2015